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Abstract
This study evaluates the impact of high-skilled immigrants on US technology formation.
Speci￿cally, we use reduced-form speci￿cations that exploit large changes in the H-1B visa
program. Fluctuations in H-1B admissions levels signi￿cantly in￿ uence the rate of Indian
and Chinese patenting in cities and ￿rms dependent upon the program relative to their
peers. Most speci￿cations ￿nd weak crowding-in e⁄ects or no e⁄ect at all for native
patenting. Total invention increases with higher admission levels primarily through the
direct contributions of ethnic inventors.
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11 Introduction
The H-1B visa program governs most admissions of temporary immigrants into the US for em-
ployment in patenting-related ￿elds. This program has become a point of signi￿cant controversy
in the public debate over immigration, with proponents and detractors at odds over how impor-
tant H-1B admission levels are for US technology advancement and whether native US workers
are being displaced by immigrants. In this study we quantify the impact of changes in H-1B
admission levels on the pace and character of US invention over the 1995-2006 period. We
hope that this assessment aids policy makers and business leaders by informing their current
discussions about appropriate admission rates in the future. Of more general interest, the vari-
ations induced by changes in H-1B admissions are an attractive laboratory for studying whether
immigrant scientists and engineers (SEs) crowd-in or crowd-out native SE workers. Identifying
this native response is important for assessing the extent to which aggregate US invention is
promoted by more ￿ exible high-skilled immigration policies.
The link between immigration policy and new innovation may appear tenuous at ￿rst, but
immigrant SEs are central to US technology formation and commercialization. In terms of levels,
immigrants represented 24% and 47% of the US SE workforce with bachelors and doctorate
educations in the 2000 Census, respectively. This contribution was signi￿cantly higher than
the 12% share of immigrants in the US working population. The growth of this importance in
recent years is even more striking. From the Current Population Survey (CPS), we estimate an
overall increase in the US SE labor force of 475k workers from 1995 to 2006. The net increase
in immigrant SEs during these twelve years was 319k workers ￿ 67% of the total. Looking
even further, the number of non-citizen SE immigrants increased by 144k, or 30% of the total
SE increase, and this simple statistic abstracts from immigrants who obtained citizenship during
the period.1
Greater in￿ ows of educated immigrants do not necessarily increase the pace of US innovation,
however. If there are large crowding-out e⁄ects, growth in immigrant SEs will displace native
SE workers and the total growth of innovation could be una⁄ected. To disentangle these issues,
it is possible to exploit variation across dimensions like geography and industry. Establishing
this variation is quite challenging with standard data sources, however. Partial correlations
also do not identify causal relationships in this context due to the endogeneity of immigrant
location decisions. For example, we show below that growth in immigrant SEs is correlated
1The details of the CPS calculations are described in Section 3. Papers describing the contributions of
immigrants to SE include Stephan and Levin (2001), Burton and Wang (1999), Johnson (1998, 2001), Streeter
(1997), Saxenian (2002a,b), Matlo⁄(2003, 2004), Miano (2005, 2008), Lowell and Christian (2000), Borjas (2005,
2006), Wadhwa et al. (2007), Chellaraj et al. (2008), Kerr (2008a,b), Peri (2007), and Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle
(2008). Freeman (2005, 2006) surveys global labor ￿ ows and discusses their deep scienti￿c impacts. General
surveys of immigration include Borjas (1994), Friedberg and Hunt (1995), and Kerr and Kerr (2008).
1with contemporaneous growth in native SEs across cities and states. A causal interpretation
of this correlation would suggest that strong crowding-in e⁄ects exist. An alternative explana-
tion, however, would be that immigrant and native SEs are simultaneously attracted to cities
and states with rapidly expanding technology opportunities and SE labor demand. Alterna-
tively, reverse causality may hold, where strong growth in native innovation attracts immigrants
directly.
To bring identi￿cation to this question, we exploit large changes in the H-1B worker popula-
tion over the 1995-2006 period. The national cap on new H-1B admissions ￿ uctuated substan-
tially over these years, ranging from a low of 65k new workers a year to a high of 195k. SE and
computer-related occupations account for approximately 60% of H-1B admissions, and changes
in the H-1B population are responsible for most of the non-citizen immigrant SE workforce
increase noted above.
Our main estimations consider di⁄erences across US cities in the extent to which they relied
on the H-1B program. Speci￿cally, we characterize di⁄erences in patenting behavior between
dependent cities and their less dependent peers resulting from shifts in H-1B admission levels.
Our analyses primarily exploit a unique data set of probable inventor ethnicities for all US
patents. These ethnicities are identi￿ed through inventors￿names ￿ for example, inventors with
the last names Gupta or Desai are more likely to be Indian than they are to be Vietnamese. The
detail of these micro-records covers the universe of US domestic invention and a⁄ords analyses
that are not possible with other data sets.
The city-level analysis divides 281 US cities into ￿ve quintiles based upon their dependency
on the H-1B program. Our empirical speci￿cations then compare how patenting growth in
the top three quintiles of the distribution responded to shifts in H-1B admissions relative to
patenting growth in the bottom two quintiles. This framework allows for non-linear e⁄ects
across dependency levels due to policy reforms. In addition to providing a richer account of
treatment e⁄ects, this ￿ exibility is important given that political economy forces may in￿ uence
the cap on admissions set by the federal government. We argue below that admission levels are
plausibly exogenous for the second and third quintiles of the dependency distribution, even if
the results from the upper quintile of 57 cities may contain some bias.
Our ￿rst ￿nding is that increases in H-1B admissions substantially increased rates of Indian
and Chinese invention in dependent cities relative to their peers. In the base speci￿cations, a
10% growth in the H-1B population increased Indian and Chinese invention by 6%-12% in the
most dependent quintile of cities relative to the bottom two quintiles. Just as importantly, the
relative rates of Indian and Chinese invention grew by 2%-7% in the second and third quintiles.
These di⁄erences are economically important and statistically di⁄erent from responses in the
2reference category. Responses are also weaker for other non-English inventor groups, which is
to be expected given the H-1B program￿ s primary pull from India and China for SE workers.
Turning to crowding-in versus crowding-out e⁄ects, positive elasticities typically exist for
inventors with English names in these estimations as well. This suggests positive e⁄ects for
natives, as English inventors account for 72% of all inventors in our sample. These elasticities,
however, are much smaller than those for other ethnicities and are often not statistically di⁄erent
from zero. In the baseline speci￿cation, a 10% growth in the H-1B population increases English
invention by 0%-1% in the most dependent quintile relative to the least. This suggests that
natives are not likely being crowded-out in large numbers by higher H-1B admissions. The
elasticities also indicate that crowding-in e⁄ects are small to the extent that they exist. Com-
bining elasticities with inventor group sizes, crowding-in contributions would be about half of
immigrants￿direct contributions in the 1% scenario, whereas all technology growth would come
from ethnic inventors themselves in the 0% scenario. Total invention is estimated to increase
by 0%-2% in the short-run.
We test the robustness of these city-level ￿ndings in several ways. We ￿rst examine di⁄erent
speci￿cations that include technology trends, state-year ￿xed e⁄ects, dropping highly dependent
cities, and dropping the patenting of a large group of the most H-1B dependent ￿rms. We also
show that our results for US cities are not re￿ ected in a placebo experiment involving shifts
in ethnic invention among Canadian cities. We further estimate a dynamic speci￿cation and
con￿rm our results through the CPS. Across the di⁄erent speci￿cations, Indian and Chinese
patenting are consistently shown to be dependent upon the H-1B program, English invention is
typically weakly correlated, and the results for other ethnicities fall in between. The majority
of our estimates suggest that native invention is either not a⁄ected by the H-1B program in the
aggregate or that a weak crowding-in e⁄ect exists.
Our ￿nal analysis considers variation in patenting within ￿rms. High-tech industry execu-
tives often argue that their ￿rms are especially prone to ￿ uctuations in H-1B admissions. We
create a panel of the most H-1B dependent ￿rms to test this claim. Higher H-1B admissions are
associated with stronger increases in Indian invention in highly dependent computer-oriented
￿rms (e.g., Microsoft, Oracle), relative to both less dependent computer-oriented ￿rms and to
highly dependent ￿rms in other sectors. On the other hand, growth in English invention is com-
parable across sectors for very dependent ￿rms, with small increases relative to less dependent
￿rms.
In a broader context, we view this paper as a building block for describing the supply side
of innovation. Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) and others have shown how the sharing of
ideas across countries can lead to higher levels of innovation in endogenous growth models.
We believe that these e⁄ects can be large with high-skilled immigration, especially when the
3knowledge needed to create new ideas is tacit. We also suspect that there may be a more subtle
mechanism at work. The demand side of the economy governs the pace of innovation in most
models of endogenous growth; larger markets encourage greater entrepreneurial innovation due
to pro￿t incentives. To facilitate this process, labor adjusts across research and manufacturing
sectors to equate wages and generate balanced growth. Shocking these economies with high-
skilled labor in￿ ows does not increase innovation except trivially through larger economy size.2
However, there are often signi￿cant adjustment costs when workers move across occupations
and sectors, particularly in moving into research-oriented occupations. Ryoo and Rosen (2004)
and others have documented the signi￿cant costs and "time to build" inherent in increasing
the supply of ideas workers, particularly in SE. Shortages of su¢ ciently trained labor may
exist even if forward-looking workers are rationally responding to incentives. These costs and
slower adjustments open up the possibility for supply shocks to US innovation through shifts
in immigration policy. Indeed, public debates about the H-1B visa often turn on whether a
shortage of high-skilled workers exists or not.
Recent work has begun to investigate these e⁄ects, generally ￿nding a positive relationship
between immigration and US inventive activity. Peri (2007) and Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle
(2008) explore long-run relationships between immigration levels and patenting rates using state-
decade variation. The latter study in particular ￿nds substantial crowding-in e⁄ects, such that
a one percentage point increase in US immigrant college graduates raises patents per capita by
about 15%. Chellaraj et al. (2008) study the contribution of international graduate students
and skilled immigration for US patenting using time-series approaches. These authors estimate
that crowding-in e⁄ects from foreign graduate students in the US are equal to half of the direct
contributions of immigrants. In contrast to these studies, Borjas (2005, 2006) ￿nds that natives
are crowded-out from graduate school enrollments by foreign students, especially in the most
elite institutions, and su⁄er lower wages after graduation due to the increased labor supply.
This disagreement in the academic literature is re￿ ected in the public debate over high-skilled
immigration and the H-1B visa in particular.
Our paper contributes to this research through its measurement of ethnic patenting and the
use of H-1B policy changes for the identi￿cation of immigrant SE in￿ ows. Our paper is the ￿rst
large-scale description of ethnic invention within ￿rms and the ￿rst study to characterize the
￿rm-level linkage of immigration and innovation. Understanding the micro-economic linkages
governing this process is important as immigration policies in￿ uence ￿rms, universities, and
other institutions di⁄erently. The small crowding-in e⁄ects that we typically measure fall in
between the results of prior academic work and the e⁄ects suggested in the public debate.3
2See, for example, the standard endogenous growth frameworks in Romer (1986, 1990), Jones (1995), and
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). See also Acemoglu and Linn (2004) and Furman et al. (2002).
3In a related paper, Foley and Kerr (2008) examine the ￿rm-level link between immigration and FDI.
4The next section of this paper describes the ethnic patenting data that we exploit in this
study. Section 3 introduces the H-1B program and provides some basic calculations about the
degree to which the H-1B program can impact US invention rates. Sections 4 and 5 present the
city and ￿rm analyses, respectively. The ￿nal section concludes.
2 US Ethnic Invention
We begin by describing our ethnic inventor data set and then proceed with simple panel esti-
mations of the relationship between ethnic inventors and English inventors. These correlations
provide a background for our study of the H-1B program, which is described in the next section.
2.1 Ethnic Patenting Data Set
We quantify ethnic technology development in the US through the individual records of all
patents granted by the United States Patent and Trademark O¢ ce (USPTO) from January 1975
to May 2008. Each patent record provides information about the invention (e.g., technology
classi￿cation, citations of prior art) and the inventors submitting the application (e.g., name,
city). Hall et al. (2001) provide extensive details about this data set. USPTO patents must
list at least one inventor, and multiple inventors are often listed. The data are extensive, with
8 million inventors associated with 4.5 million granted patents during this period.
To estimate ethnicities, a commercial database of ethnic ￿rst names and surnames is mapped
into inventor records. Kerr (2007) documents name-matching algorithms, lists frequent ethnic
names, and provides extensive descriptive statistics. The match rate is 98% for domestic
inventors, and the process a⁄ords the distinction of nine ethnicities: Chinese, English, European,
Hispanic, Indian, Japanese, Korean, Russian, and Vietnamese. Kerr (2007) also discusses quality
assurance exercises performed. One such exercise regards the composition of foreign patents
registered with the USPTO. We are able to assign ethnicities to 98% of foreign records, and we
￿nd that the resulting estimated inventor compositions are quite reasonable. For example, 85%
to 90% of inventors ￿ling from India and China are classi￿ed as ethnically Indian and Chinese.
This is in line with what we would expect, as native shares should be less than 100% due to the
role that foreign inventors play in these countries. Since our regressions mostly employ ethnic
patenting as a dependent variable, remaining measurement error in inventor ethnicities will not
substantively in￿ uence the consistency of our estimates.
Table 1 describes the 1975-2004 US sample, while Figure 1 illustrates the evolving ethnic
contribution to US technology development as a percentage of patents granted by the USPTO.
5These statistics are just for inventors residing in the US. The trends demonstrate a growing
ethnic contribution to US technological development, especially among Indian and Chinese sci-
entists. Ethnic inventors are more concentrated in high-tech industries like computers and
pharmaceuticals and in gateway cities relatively closer to their home countries (e.g., Chinese in
San Francisco, Europeans in New York, and Hispanics in Miami). The ￿nal three rows of Table
1 demonstrate a close correspondence between the estimated mean ethnic composition during
the period with the country-of-birth composition of the US SE workforce in the 1990 Census.
The appendix lists major US cities and their shares of total patenting, non-English patenting,
and Indian and Chinese patenting.4 We de￿ne cities through 281 Metropolitan Statistical Areas.
Not surprisingly, total patenting shares are highly correlated with city size, with the three largest
shares of US domestic patenting for 1995-2004 found in San Francisco (12%), New York (7%),
and Los Angeles (6%). More interestingly, non-English patenting is more concentrated than
general innovation. The 1995-2004 non-English patent shares of San Francisco, New York, and
Los Angeles are 19%, 10%, and 8%, respectively. Similarly, 81% of non-English invention occurs
in the top 47 patenting cities listed in the appendix, compared to 73% of total patenting. Indian
and Chinese invention is even further agglomerated. San Francisco shows exceptional growth
from an 8% share of total US Indian and Chinese patenting in 1975-1984 to 25% in 1995-2004,
while the combined shares of New York and Chicago decline from 22% to 13%.5
Figures 2 and 3 provide a more detailed view of Indian and Chinese contributions for di⁄erent
technology sectors. These two ethnicities are more concentrated in high-tech sectors than in
traditional ￿elds, and their 1990s growth as a share of US innovation is remarkable. A large
portion of this growth is due to the rapid economic development of these countries and their
greater SE integration with the US. Similarly, sustained US economic growth during the period
likely made America more attractive as a host country. The US Immigration Act of 1990 also
facilitated greater permanent immigration of SE workers from these countries in the early 1990s
(e.g., Kerr 2008a).
Figure 3 exhibits an interesting downturn in the Indian share of computer-related invention
after 2000, which includes software patents. This shift from the strong growth in the 1990s
is striking and may re￿ ect more restrictive US immigration policies. Many factors contribute,
however, such as the high-tech recession and the increasing attractiveness of foreign opportunities
like Bangalore. Accordingly, our estimations control for these aggregate trends through year
￿xed e⁄ects. Nonetheless, macro trends document substantial shifts in ethnic invention patterns
over the last decade.
4The appendix contains both extended empirical results and details about the data set development. It is
available at http://www.people.hbs.edu/wkerr/.
5Agrawal et al. (2007a,b), Mandor⁄ (2007), and Kerr (2008b) further describe issues in ethnic agglomeration.
The former studies are particularly interesting in their theoretical depiction of the substitutability between
ethnic social ties and geographic proximity. Di⁄erences between a social planner￿ s optimal distribution of ethnic
members, and what the inventors themselves would choose, can emerge.
6The base data contain information on all patents granted from January 1975 to May 2008.
Application years of patents, however, provide the best description of when innovative research
is being undertaken due to the existence of substantial and uneven lags in USPTO reviews.
Accordingly, annual descriptions employed in this study are measured through patent application
years. This standard approach leads to sample attrition after 2004 as many applications have
not been processed for approval at the time of writing. To compensate for this, we also employ a
data set of 1.8m published patent applications, which the USPTO began releasing in 2000. Our
preferred data set combines the patent grants and applications data, removing multiple records
for the same patent. This union yields more consistent sample sizes in later years. We also
consider estimations that use grants data only in robustness checks.
While the ethnic patenting data provide a tractable platform for examining immigration
and innovation, it is important to discuss explicitly the data￿ s limitations and the extent to
which these issues in￿ uence our analysis. First, our approach does not distinguish between
foreign-born inventors in the US and later generations working in SE. The panel econometrics
employed, however, identify o⁄ of relative changes in ethnic inventor populations. For Indian
and Chinese inventors, these changes are mainly due to new immigration or school-to-work
transitions that require a visa, substantially weakening this overall concern. On a similar note,
we study crowding-in and crowding-out through inventors with English names. In addition to
capturing e⁄ects on US natives, inventors with English names also re￿ ect some immigration from
the UK, Canada, etc. The magnitudes of H-1B-related in￿ ows from English ethnicity countries
suggest that this second factor is very small. Temporary workers from Canada and the UK
account for about 10k new H-1B workers annually over the 2000-2005 period, a small number
compared to a native SE workforce of more than 2.5m. Our robustness checks using the CPS
further allay both of these concerns.
2.2 Correlations of Ethnic Invention and English Invention
Before discussing the H-1B program, it is useful to describe correlations in ethnic inventor growth
across cities. This exercise has descriptive value, and it introduces questions about endogeneity
that we address in our reduced-form analysis. We estimate for city c and year t,
ln(PAT
Dep
c;t ) = ￿c + ￿t + ￿ ￿ ln(PAT
Ind;Chn
c;t ) + ￿c;t; (1)
where ￿c and ￿t are vectors of city and year ￿xed e⁄ects, respectively. Our dependent variables
are the log of the total number of patents in a city-year and the log of the number of patents
by English inventors. Our key explanatory variable is the log of the total number of patents
by Indian and Chinese inventors. We focus on patenting by these two ethnicities here because
they play a disproportionate role in the H-1B visa program.
7Table 2 documents the partial correlations. Estimations consider 281 cities over the years
1995-2006 for a total of 3372 observations. We discount multiple inventors on a patent such that
each patent receives the same weight. We only include patents where all of the inventors work
in the US for this exercise and for our other domestic analyses. Regressions are unweighted
and cluster standard errors by city to address the serial correlation concerns of Bertrand et al.
(2004) when exploiting high-frequency variation.
Panel A employs English ethnicity patenting as the dependent variable, while Panel B con-
siders total patenting. The upper left coe¢ cient in Column 1 documents a 0.14 elasticity
between city-level growth in Indian and Chinese patenting and the growth of English patenting.
To put this in perspective, this suggests that a 10% increase in Indian and Chinese patenting
correlates with a 1.4% increase in English patenting. This partial correlation should not be
interpreted as a causal parameter due to potential omitted variable biases and reverse causality.
The strong and positive e⁄ect, however, does provide some prima facie evidence against very
strong crowding-out e⁄ects.
Columns 2-5 provide several robustness checks on these correlation estimates. We ￿rst
introduce a measure of the expected patenting in each city due to aggregate technology trends and
the pre-period composition of each city￿ s invention. Section 4 contains a detailed description of
how we construct these technology trends. The results from this estimation indicate that changes
in national technology trends or USPTO grant rates are not responsible for the estimated positive
correlations. Our further analyses in Columns 3-5 retain this expected patenting measure.
Column 3 shows that the elasticity estimates are robust to including state-year ￿xed e⁄ects that
account for regional di⁄erences in city growth. Finally, Columns 4 and 5 provide some simple
checks on the composition of the sample. Column 4 weights the regression by the 1994 city
populations, while Column 5 drops the top 20% of cities in terms of 1994 population. The
stability of the elasticities across these two permutations indicates that correlations are not due
to small outliers or exclusive to major population centers only.
Panel B reports elasticities for total invention. These patenting correlations are naturally
stronger than Panel A￿ s English ethnicity correlations, as total patenting includes the direct
contributions of ethnic inventors as well. Signi￿cant and positive results are found across all
speci￿cations. To see what these estimates mean for US invention generally, we consider a simple
adding-up exercise. Indian and Chinese inventors account for roughly 13% of US domestic
patents over 1995-2006, compared with a 72% share for English inventors. A hypothetical
10% increase in Indian and Chinese invention directly contributes about 1.3% to total invention
growth (i.e., 10% x 13%). Brie￿ y assuming a causal crowding-in e⁄ect, the concomitant 1.4%
increase in English invention would also contribute 1.0% to total invention (i.e., 1.4% x 72%) due
to the larger inventor population over which the 0.14 elasticity is applied. This would suggest
8an indirect e⁄ect equal to about three-quarters of the direct contribution. These estimates are
approximate and do not add up directly to the estimated 2.1%, as we do not consider other
factors such as the patenting of other ethnicities and spatial di⁄erences that exist in ethnic
inventor populations. We present them to highlight the fact that even small elasticities for
English inventors can have important economic e⁄ects due to the large inventor population over
which they are estimated.
The appendix extends this analysis. We ￿rst estimate speci￿cation (1) individually for
the ￿ve largest ethnic patenting groups: Indian, Chinese, European, Hispanic, and Russian.
Univariate elasticities of 0.11 are measured between English patenting growth and Indian or
Chinese patenting growth. European and Hispanic elasticities are larger at 0.15 and 0.13,
respectively, while the Russian univariate correlation is weaker at 0.08. Growth in European
and Hispanic patenting, which are not treated in the simple estimates of Table 2, are more
correlated with English invention growth than Indian and Chinese patenting. This could be
due to two factors. Table 1 shows that European and Hispanic inventors are more concentrated
in technology ￿elds and cities common to English inventors. The second factor, which relates
to a limitation of our methodology, is that European and Hispanic names overlap more with
English names than they do with names of Asian ethnicities.
These two traits are important for interpreting our city-level analysis of the H-1B program.
Analyses that trace English invention responses to local shocks in Indian and Chinese inven-
tion stemming from changes in H-1B admissions are less likely to be confounded by omitted
variables or name overlaps than similar European-based immigration shocks. In this sense,
the H-1B program is a relatively clean laboratory for quantifying crowding-in or crowding-out
e⁄ects. Treatment e⁄ects will, however, be determined in sectors and cities where English
inventors are less common (but typically still the majority). Measured e⁄ects due to Indian
and Chinese shocks may underestimate or overestimate the latent treatment e⁄ects for other
immigrant groups that are naturally closer to English invention.
Additional estimations con￿rm that these results hold individually for granted patents and
patent applications. Second, while all city-year cells have some patenting, smaller cities can
lack Indian or Chinese patenting. Estimations recode counts of less than one ethnic patent for
a given city-year observation to be equal to one ethnic patent. We do so under the claim that is
not meaningful to distinguish between zero and one Indian or Chinese patent for a city. This is
merely done to maintain consistent sample sizes and elasticity estimates strengthen only slightly
when we instead drop zero-valued cells. The results are further robust to dropping the West
Coast, looking within ￿rms, or employing a ￿rst-di⁄erenced version of equation (1).6
6The e¢ ciency of a ￿rst-di⁄erenced form versus the levels speci￿cation turns on whether the error term is
autoregressive. If autoregressive deviations are substantial, the ￿rst-di⁄erenced form is preferred; a unit-root error
is fully corrected. If there is no serial correlation, however, ￿rst di⁄erencing introduces a moving-average error
93 H-1B Visa Program
This section overviews the H-1B visa program and provides a back-of-the-envelope analysis of
how large its impact for US SE can be. We focus on SE workers as they produce the large
majority of patented innovations. This description concentrates on the major features of the
H-1B program relevant for our analysis, and we refer interested readers to Lowell and Christian
(2000), Lowell (2000), Matlo⁄ (2003), and Kirkegaard (2005) for additional details. Facchini et
al. (2008) overview other temporary immigration categories.
3.1 Overview of the H-1B Visa Program
The H-1B visa is a temporary immigration category that allows US employers to seek short-
term help from skilled foreigners in "specialty occupations." These occupations are de￿ned as
those requiring the theoretical and practical application of a specialized body of knowledge (e.g.,
engineering, accounting); virtually all successful H-1B applicants have a bachelors education or
above. The visa is used especially for SE and computer-related occupations, which account for
roughly 60% of successful applications. Approximately 40% and 10% of H-1B recipients over
2000-2005 came from India and China, respectively. Shares for other countries are all less than
5%; almost all are less than 3%.
The sponsoring ￿rm is responsible for ￿ling the H-1B application and must specify an indi-
vidual candidate. The employer-employee match must therefore be made before the application
is submitted. Di⁄erent employers can simultaneously seek visas for the same prospective em-
ployee, although ￿rms generally make applications only on behalf of committed workers due
to the time and legal fees involved. The application fee for a ￿rm with 26 or more full-time
employees was $2,320 in 2008.
Workers are tied to their sponsoring ￿rm, although some very recent changes have increased
visa portability. Firms can petition for permanent residency (i.e., a green card) on behalf of the
worker. If permanent residency is not obtained, the H-1B worker must leave the US at the end
of the visa period for at least one year before applying again. Firms are also required to pay
the higher of (1) the prevailing wage in the ￿rm for the position to be ￿lled or (2) the prevailing
wage for the occupation in the area of intended employment. These restrictions were designed
to prevent H-1B employers from abusing their relationships with foreign workers and to protect
the wages of domestic workers.
component. Estimations of the autoregressive error parameter in the levels speci￿cation (1) ￿nd serial correlations
of 0.2; the serial correlation of -0.4 is stronger in the ￿rst-di⁄erenced form. The levels speci￿cation is thus our
preferred estimation technique but we report the ￿rst-di⁄erenced form as a robustness check. These estimations
￿nd marginally weaker correlations for the English ethnicity and similar correlations for total patenting.
10Kirkegaard (2005) provides evidence that ￿rms often use the H-1B program to keep wage
costs down but are largely in accordance with the law in terms of the wages that they o⁄er to
their visa-holding workers. Lowell (2001) and Zavodny (2003) ￿nd limited evidence that the
H-1B program in￿ uences native wages. In contrast, Matlo⁄(2003, 2004) discusses abuses of the
system, and Miano (2005) debates whether the prevailing wage requirement is e⁄ectual. A 2008
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS, the successor to the Immigration
and Naturalization Service) study ￿nds recent evidence of fraud or technical violations in 20%
of sampled H-1B cases, with incident rates especially high among small employers and human
resources ￿rms.
Since the Immigration Act of 1990, there has been an annual cap on the number of H-1B
visas that can be issued. The cap governs new H-1B visa issuances only; renewals for the
second three-year term are exempt and the maximum length of stay on an H-1B visa is thus six
years. Unlike permanent immigration, immediate family members of the H-1B worker do not
count towards the visa cap. These family members are, however, restricted from working unless
they otherwise obtain an appropriate work visa. Free trade agreements require that 1,400 and
5,400 of the visas be reserved for citizens of Chile and Singapore, respectively. These special
allotments are often under-utilized, however, and the excess capacity is returned to the general
pool.
While most of the other aspects of the H-1B program have remained constant over the past
15 years, the cap has ￿ uctuated signi￿cantly. The largest amount of controversy about the
H-1B program focuses on this cap. Indeed, a search of Lexis-Nexis ￿nds more than three
thousand news articles about the visa from 1995-2006. Prominent peaks in media attention are
evident during legislative debates about raising or lowering the cap. Executives of high-tech
￿rms often argue that lower H-1B admissions in recent years have starved their ￿rms of needed
talent and hindered US innovation. They suggest that higher admissions are necessary to keep
US businesses competitive, to spur innovation and growth, and to keep ￿rms from shifting their
operations abroad. Detractors, on the other hand, argue that the H-1B program displaces
American workers, lowers wages, and discourages on-the-job training (e.g., Matlo⁄2003, 2004).7
Figure 4 plots the evolution of the numerical cap. The 65k cap was not binding in the early
1990s but became so by the middle of the decade. Two pieces of legislation, the American
Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998 and the American Competitiveness
in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000, sharply increased the cap over the next ￿ve years to
7Bill Gates￿March 2007 Congressional Testimony illustrates the ￿rst perspective: "I personally witness the
ill e⁄ects of these (H-1B) policies on an almost daily basis at Microsoft ... The current base cap of 65,000 is
arbitrarily set and bears no relation to US industry￿ s demand for skilled professionals."
Milton Friedman￿ s July 2002 ComputerWorld interview, on the other hand, illustrates the second perspective:
"There is no doubt that the (H-1B) program is a bene￿t to their employers, enabling them to get workers at a
lower wage, and to that extent, it is a subsidy."
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today are engaged in ￿erce competition in global markets" and "are faced with severe high-skill
labor shortages that threaten their competitiveness."8 These short-term increases were allowed
to expire during the US￿high-tech downturn, when visa demand fell short of the cap. The cap
returned to the 65k level in 2004 and became binding again, despite being subsequently raised
by 20k through an "advanced degree" exemption.
The two closest temporary worker visas to the H-1B are the L-1 and TN visas. Neither
of these visa categories is a particularly good substitute for the H-1B. The L-1 is issued to
multinationals in order to bring in managers or employees with "specialized knowledge" that have
worked for the ￿rm abroad for at least one year. The TN visa was established under NAFTA and
allows citizens from Mexico and Canada to work in the US in certain high-skilled occupations.
Both of these programs are less than 10% of the size of the H-1B program for high-tech workers
during the 1995-2006 period and contain institutional features that limit ￿rms￿ability to use
them to circumvent the H-1B quota. Neither visa category shows substantial increases after
the H-1B cap was dramatically reduced in 2004, and the Department of Homeland Security
has concluded that limited substitution exists across the H-1B and L-1 visas. The appendix
discusses these other temporary visas further.
Prior research on the H-1B visa program is sparse and mostly descriptive due to data lim-
itations. Indeed, these data constraints signi￿cantly shape our empirical approach discussed
below. The most important work for our study are estimates of the H-1B entry rates and
population stocks, neither of which is de￿nitively known. Lowell (2000) builds a demographic
model for this purpose, and Figure 4 shows his updated estimates provided to us for this paper.
The H-1B population grew rapidly in the late 1990s, before leveling o⁄ after 2000. The lack
of growth immediately after 2000 can be traced to weak US employment opportunities for SE
during the high-tech recession.
While demand has since grown, the reduced supply of H-1B visas now restricts growth in
the H-1B population. This constraint is obscured in Figure 4, where Lowell￿ s estimated entry
rates exceed the cap. This decoupling of the numerical cap and H-1B entry rates is due to
the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000. This legislation made
universities, government research labs, and certain nonpro￿ts exempt from the cap and took
e⁄ect in ￿scal year 2001. We consequently focus our analyses exclusively on patents from the
private-sector that have been subject to the cap throughout the 1995-2006 period. We also test
in robustness checks whether using Lowell￿ s population estimates or a measure based solely on
the cap materially in￿ uences our results.
8See Reksulak et al. (2006) and Public Law 105-777, Division C, American Competitiveness and Workforce
Improvement Law, Section 416(c)(2).
12Firms in particular remain subject to the cap and their growth in H-1B usage is clearly
constrained. USCIS begins accepting applications on April 1st for the following ￿scal year and
announces when the cap is reached. It has been reached in every ￿scal year since the cap was
lowered. Moreover, the cap was reached in the ￿rst day of accepting applications for the last
two ￿scal years. Further evidence on the high level of labor demand in SE in recent years comes
from Kannankutty (2008), who documents a 2.5% SE unemployment rate in 2006, the lowest
unemployment rate measured for SE since the early 1990s. While H-1B visas were historically
issued on a ￿rst-come, ￿rst-served basis, a lottery has been recently employed due to rapid
over-subscription. There are few additional guidelines on how the visas are allocated across
applicants. This lottery system has been criticized because it does not allow for a preference
ordering of candidates nor account for where high-skilled labor needs are the most pressing.
Whether the H-1B visa promotes job creation for natives is also strongly debated. In 2008
Congressional testimony, Bill Gates reported that Microsoft hires on average four additional em-
ployees to support each H-1B worker hired. A NFAP 2008 study similarly found that technology
companies in the S&P 500 increased their overall employment by ￿ve workers for every H-1B
visa requested. Miano (2008) and others strongly debate these claims, however, and argue that
crowding-out e⁄ects occur. Our study considers employment e⁄ects for native inventors and
SE workers. It is beyond this paper￿ s scope to consider job creation or displacement for other
occupations like support sta⁄, even within high-tech ￿rms.
As a ￿nal note, it is worth mentioning that an important shift in the type of workers using
H-1B visas occurred during the 1995-2006 sample period (e.g., Hira 2004). The share of H-1B
visas granted to healthcare and therapy occupations declined dramatically from 54% in 1995 to
14% in 1998. SE and computer specialist occupations grew from 25% to 57% during this same
period, and the SE sector has been dominant since this inversion. We do not explicitly consider
these changes due to the clear endogeneity of occupational demand ￿ it is better conceptually
to consider aggregate visa allocations and populations. It should be noted, however, that Figure
4￿ s H-1B population estimates understate growth for SE speci￿cally in the late 1990s.
3.2 How Much Can the H-1B Program Impact US Invention?
Our work builds on these H-1B population estimates to consider the economic consequences of
changes in the H-1B program for US innovation. Given the substantial controversy surrounding
the program, it is useful to frame our empirical analysis with back-of-the-envelope estimates of
how large impacts from shifts in H-1B admissions can be for the US SE workforce. We estimate
from the CPS a mean US SE workforce of 3.2m for 1995-2006. This includes all workers aged 20-
65 with a bachelors education or above. We include computer scientists but exclude technicians
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3.2m workers, with naturalized immigrants accounting for an additional 9%.
We consider tracing the possible SE workforce consequences following a one-year increase in
H-1B admissions of 65k visas. Shifts of this magnitude are well within past program changes and
recent policy proposals, some of which recommend increases of more than 100k visas. Holding
everything else constant, an in￿ ow of 65k additional H-1B holders would increase the non-citizen
immigrant SE workforce by 40k. This assumes that 60% of the additional visas are devoted to
SE occupations, the approximate share since the late 1990s.
An additional in￿ ow of 40k SE workers would increase the US non-citizen SE labor force by
around 12% during the sample. This increase would be a 150% increase in the median annual
growth rate of non-citizen SE workers. It would be even larger for Indian and Chinese SE
populations, given their concentrated role in the H-1B program. Unfortunately, the CPS does
not distinguish H-1B holders from other temporary worker categories9 or non-citizen permanent
residents. H-1B workers account for the large majority of temporary SE workers, however, and
the estimated net growth in H-1B SE workers can fully explain the net growth of non-citizen
immigrant SEs during 1995-2006.
Overall, the 40k worker in￿ ow would increase the total US SE labor force by about 1.2%,
holding everything else constant. This increase would be about half of the median annual
growth rate of SE workers, calculated at 2.7% during the period. The total SE workforce would
grow by less, or even contract, if new arrivals crowd-out domestic counterparts. On the other
hand, overall growth could be larger if immigrants crowd-in domestic activity. Regardless of
crowding-in or crowding-out e⁄ects, however, our calculations show that the H-1B program does
not have su¢ cient size to dramatically alter aggregate levels of US invention in the short run
that our work studies. Said simply, doubling the H-1B cap will not double the total number
of new US patents over the next ￿ve years. On the other hand, the program does have the
size to substantially in￿ uence the growth rate of US invention, which is what our empirical
speci￿cations test. Faster innovation growth would have substantial economic impacts when
compounded over time. Moreover, concentrated impacts would exist for very dependent cities
and ￿rms.10
9For example, the L-1, TN, exchange visitors (J), or immigrants of extraordinary ability (O) visas
10These estimates are order-of-magnitude only. The CPS was redesigned in 2003 to conform to the 2000
Census. This redesign unfortunately produces substantial coding breaks for many variables of interest to this
study. As noted below, US patenting in recent years extends beyond traditional SE ￿elds to areas like ￿nancial
services. These SE calculations abstract from these other sectors.
143.3 Available H-1B Data
The above calculations can bound the potential impacts of the H-1B program but they do
not establish that a link exists between H-1B visa levels and US innovation patterns. To
characterize this linkage, we assemble the available data speci￿c to the H-1B program. The
American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998 requires that information
about successful H-1B visa applications be submitted each year to Congress. Our ￿rst data
source are these "Characteristics of Specialty Occupation Workers (H-1B)" publications, which
provide the broad statistics cited in this paper.
Our second data source comprises two lists of the top US ￿rms that sponsor H-1B visas.
The ￿rst list was published by the US Immigration and Naturalization Services and documents
the top 102 employers that received H-1B visa approvals over a ￿ve-month period starting in
October of 1999 (1999 Top 100). The second list was published by BusinessWeek magazine and
contains similar information for the top 200 H-1B employers in the 2006 ￿scal year (2006 Top
200). Both of these lists are ￿ ow measures of within-period H-1B approvals, rather than stock
measures of total visa reliance. These two lists, along with an update BusinessWeek made in
2007, are the only data we have been able to assemble on ￿rm usage of these visas.
Our third data source consists of published micro-records on Labor Condition Applications
(LCAs). To obtain an H-1B visa, an employer must ￿rst ￿le an LCA with the US Department
of Labor (DOL). The primary purpose of the LCA is to demonstrate that the worker in question
will be employed in accordance with US law. The second step in the application process after the
LCA is approved is to ￿le a petition with the USCIS, which makes the ultimate determination
about the visa application. The DOL releases micro-records on all applications it receives,
numbering 1.8m for the 2001-2006 period. These records include (1) the name of the ￿rm, (2)
the proposed work location (city and state) and wage, (3) a categorization of the type of job,
and (4) relevant dates. The appendix provides a complete description of this resource and its
preparation. These data are a foothold for examining both city and ￿rm dependencies, although
it should be noted that LCA approvals do not translate one-for-one into H-1B grants.
3.4 Indian Firms and H-1B Visa Usage
Before examining the relationship between innovation and H-1B visa levels, it is worth discussing
the use of these visas by Indian ￿rms. In the 2006 Top 200 list, four of the top ￿ve users of H-1B
visas were Indian ￿rms like Infosys and Wipro. This represented a substantial increase in the
ranking of Indian ￿rms from the 1999 Top 100 list, which was mostly dominated by American
￿rms. Many detractors of the H-1B program point to this concentration among foreign ￿rms
15as evidence that the H-1B program is now serving as a vehicle for sta¢ ng by foreign ￿rms, with
possible o⁄-shoring motivations, versus addressing the SE needs of US ￿rms.
Our analysis does not address this aspect of the H-1B program. These Indian ￿rms have
only a handful of patents in the US, so our city-level measures of US innovation rates by Indian
inventors are not materially in￿ uenced. We also restrict our ￿rm panel to publicly listed US
companies. If anything, shifts in the last few sample years towards greater visa usage by Indian
￿rms reduce estimates of the impact that visa levels have for US innovation outcomes. We hope
to explore the use of H-1B visas by Indian ￿rms in future research.
4 City-Level Analysis of the H-1B Program
We now turn to reduced-form estimations that quantify whether shifts in H-1B admission levels
are correlated with stronger or weaker innovation in dependent cities. The next section extends
this framework for ￿rm-level analyses.
4.1 Empirical Strategy and Data Set Development
We begin by outlining our estimating equation and then work backwards to relevant variables and
parameters. Our estimations quantify the H-1B program￿ s e⁄ects by examining relative impacts
across cities. We group cities into ￿ve quintiles of dependency, with each quintile containing 56
or 57 cities. These city groupings are ￿xed, and we discuss below how dependency levels are
speci￿cally measured.
Our baseline speci￿cations take the form,
ln(PAT
Dep
c;t ) = ￿c + ￿t (2)
+￿1 ￿ [Ic(Top Quintile) ￿ ln(H-1Bt)]
+￿2 ￿ [Ic(2nd Quintile) ￿ ln(H-1Bt)]
+￿3 ￿ [Ic(3rd Quintile) ￿ ln(H-1Bt)] + ￿c;t;
where ￿c and ￿t are vectors of city and year ￿xed e⁄ects, respectively. Our dependent variables
of interest are the log of the number of ethnic and overall patents by city. H-1Bt is a measure of
the visa-holding population in year t. We lag the years shown in Figure 4 by one year to align
USCIS ￿scal years with calendar years for patents. Before interacting, logarithms of H-1Bt are
taken to remove scale dependency.
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quintiles of H-1B dependency. The bottom two quintiles, accounting for 40% of US cities but
only 1% of LCA applications, serve as the reference group. E⁄ects for the top three quintiles
are measured relative to this group. This ￿ exible speci￿cation thus tests whether innovation
patterns in cities thought to be dependent upon H-1B workers are more or less sensitive to
changes in H-1B population levels. Considering the top three quintiles separately allows us
to test for non-linear e⁄ects in the city distribution. Main e⁄ects for I(￿) and ln(H-1Bt) are
absorbed into the panel ￿xed e⁄ects ￿c and ￿t. Only the residual variation is exploited for
identi￿cation.
This approach, absent omitted variable biases, properly identi￿es treatment e⁄ects if H-1B
admission decisions are made nationally by the US federal government but have heterogeneous
impacts across cities due to local di⁄erences. This reduced-form approach also circumvents
concerns surrounding endogenous sorting across markets by workers. On the other hand, esti-
mations for the top quintile can be biased upwards if a small group of cities or ￿rms exerts a
substantial impact on admissions decisions, through lobbying and similar e⁄orts, and likewise
receives disproportionate impacts. The non-parametric nature of (2) addresses this problem by
directly examining impacts on invention in the second and third quintiles that have very little
or no in￿ uence on H-1B admission choices. We will also test the robustness of the treatment
e⁄ects in the top quintile by dropping cities with extreme sensitivity to the program.
De￿ning cities as the relevant market for these e⁄ects is an important decision. The appro-
priate market de￿nition should re￿ ect the speeds of SE labor, product, and technology ￿ ows.
One perspective is that the SE market is national in scope. This is certainly true in the long
run given the high mobility of skilled workers and the H-1B program￿ s national quotas. In
this case, limited progress can be made with geographic variation. On the other hand, many
industry executives suggest they operate in a very constrained environment, and the H-1B visa
is speci￿c to a ￿rm-worker match. In this case, one could argue that the short-run analysis is
best undertaken at the level of the ￿rm or perhaps across a grouping of very dependent ￿rms.
We believe that cities are an appropriate choice, however, given the location-speci￿c nature of
H-1B visas, local labor mobility, and short-run rigidities in ￿rm location choices. Agglomeration
studies typically identify cities and commuting regions as the relevant spatial unit for labor
market e⁄ects on ￿rms, and technology spillovers are found to operate at even shorter distances
(e.g., Rosenthal and Strange 2001, 2003, Ellison et al. 2007, and Glaeser and Kerr 2008).
Cities are also more appropriate than states as economic units in this context. For example, a
state-level dependency for North Carolina would mask substantial di⁄erences between Raleigh-
Durham and Wilmington, among the most and least H-1B dependent cities nationally. From
an econometric perspective, this granularity allows for stronger regional trends and controls. In
17the next section, we will also examine ￿rm and sector level variation to test the arguments put
forth by high-tech executives.11
Our ￿rst measure of a city￿ s dependency on the H-1B program is derived from the microdata
on LCAs collected by the DOL. This measure is constructed as the yearly average of the
city￿ s LCAs in 2001-2002 normalized by the city population. There are several advantages
of this metric. First, it is very closely tied to the H-1B program and can be measured for
all cities. Second, the metric can be extended to the ￿rm level, a disaggregation that we
exploit in Section 5. Finally, LCAs measure latent demand for H-1B visas ￿ demand is
measured independent of whether an H-1B visa is ultimately realized or not. Moreover, the
demand is real in that non-trivial application and legal costs exist, and ￿rms must list individual
candidates on accompanying documents. These strengths of the LCA-based dependency make
it our preferred metric, although its measurement during the sample period may upwardly bias
measured treatment e⁄ects.
Given this latter weakness of the LCA metric, our second measure is the 1990 count of
immigrant SEs in the city who are not US citizens, again normalized by city population. It
is calculated from the 1990 Census of Populations. This metric is much more conservative,
being entirely measured before the 1990s growth in SE immigration evident in Figures 1-3.
This measure also has the nice advantage of allowing contrasts with Canadian cities that we
exploit below. Its primary disadvantage is that the non-citizen immigrant category includes
permanent residents and many types of temporary workers besides H-1B holders (e.g., exchange
visitors, students). Measurement error in the regressor of this form will bias elasticity estimates
downward from their true treatment e⁄ects.12
Table 3 documents the twenty most dependent cities for each metric. A number of big cities
are dependent upon the H-1B program, which is similar to other immigration clustering, but
many smaller cities are in￿ uenced as well. San Francisco is the most dependent city in the
LCA-based ranking. In the Census-based ranking, Lafayette - West Lafayette, IN, and Bryan-
College Station, TX, are ranked higher than San Francisco. These cities are home to Purdue
University and Texas A&M University, respectively, and their surrounding SE industries. Other
heavily dependent cities include Raleigh-Durham, Boston, and Washington, although consider-
able variation exists outside of the top rankings. The least dependent cities are Pascagoula,
MS, and Rapid City, SD, according to the LCA and Census metrics, respectively. The pairwise
correlation of the two rankings is 0.5 across all cities. While we report the raw dependencies
11Borjas (2003) argues analyzing immigration through education-experience cells under the assumption of an
otherwise national labor market. The H-1B program is almost entirely con￿ned to workers with bachelors
education levels and above, limiting the e⁄ectiveness of this technique.
12We employ the IPUMS 5% state sample for these calculations to maximize sample size. This prohibits us
from calculating direct metrics for small cities that comprise about 20% of the sample. For these cases, we
employ the state-level dependency. We ￿nd similar results if we drop these cases.
18in Table 3, we only use these numerical values to order cities for the quintile groupings. The
appendix describes these data sources and preparation in greater detail and further documents
the dependencies of major patenting cities.
4.2 City-Level Empirical Results
Tables 4A and 4B present our baseline empirical results using city-level variation. Column
headers indicate dependent variables. We test for e⁄ects on the log level of city patenting for
four ethnic groups: Indian, Chinese, other non-English ethnicities, and English inventors. The
Other Ethnicity category excludes Indian, Chinese, and English inventors. The ￿fth column
considers total patenting in the city. We cluster standard errors by city.
The ￿rst column of Panel A in Table 4A ￿nds a positive relationship between increases in
H-1B visa allocations and Indian patenting in dependent cities. The upper left coe¢ cient of
0.313 suggests that a 10% increase in the H-1B population is associated with a 3% increase
in Indian patenting for the middle quintile relative to the bottom 40% of cities. E⁄ects are
larger for the upper two quintiles, suggesting 6% and 10% increases in patenting relative to the
reference group. These ￿ estimates are statistically precise and economically meaningful in size
relative to Indian patenting. Moreover, the 10% increase discussed is realistic as the average
annual increase in the H-1B population during the sample period is 8%. These simple empirics
thus support our hypothesis that the H-1B visa program has a substantial impact on the level
and spatial location of Indian patenting.
Column 2 ￿nds a slightly larger correlation between Chinese invention and the city depen-
dency interaction. While we anticipated that Chinese inventors would show an important
dependency on the H-1B program, the comparable elasticity to Indian invention is somewhat
surprising given that the Chinese H-1B in￿ ow is smaller relative to the overall population of
Chinese inventors in the US. Several factors likely lead to more equal elasticities, including a
weaker propensity among marginal Indian H-1B holders to engage in patenting compared to
Chinese holders. This also might re￿ ect crowding-in e⁄ects for other Chinese inventors, which
we will see some suggestive evidence of below. While city-level exercises ￿nd comparable Indian
and Chinese e⁄ects, the Indian response is found to be stronger in the ￿rm panel considered in
Section 5.
The more signi￿cant contrasts are between Indian and Chinese inventors in Columns 1 and
2 and other ethnicities in Columns 3 and 4. Column 3 shows that other non-English ethnic
groups (e.g., European, Hispanic, Korean) increase patenting in dependent cities, too. This
response is substantially smaller in magnitude than Indian and Chinese estimates in the upper
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expectations about the distribution of impacts of the program across di⁄erent immigrant groups.
Column 4 further ￿nds that English invention in dependent cities is weakly correlated with
shifts in H-1B admissions. Although none of the estimates is statistically signi￿cant, we estimate
that a 10% increase in the H-1B population is associated with a 0.5%-1% increase in English
invention in the top two quintiles relative to the reference group. These elasticities are about
a tenth of the relative magnitudes estimated for Indian and Chinese inventors. Note that this
is a matter of relative economic importance rather than statistical precision, as standard errors
are roughly uniform across columns. While not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, the positive
response of English invention provides some evidence against immigrants associated with the H-
1B program crowding-out US natives in large numbers. A strong interpretation would further
suggest a modest crowding-in e⁄ect.
The ￿nal column ￿nds a positive e⁄ect for total patenting. The weaker e⁄ect for total
invention compared to Columns 1 and 2 is to be expected given that Indian and Chinese inventors
comprise about 13% of all US domestic patenting during the period studied. The estimates
suggest that a 10% growth in the H-1B worker population is associated with a 2% increase in
patenting for the most dependent quintile relative to the bottom 40% of cities. E⁄ects are
smaller at 0.4%-0.8% for the second and third quintiles.
Panel B of Table 4 repeats the estimations with the Census-based dependency. The overall
picture remains the same as in Panel A, especially the ordering across ethnicities. Elasticities
with the Census-based dependency are smaller across the board, likely due to a combination of
greater conservatism and more measurement error in the estimated dependencies. The positive
association with growth in English invention is no longer present in the top quintile but it does
persist in the second and third quintiles, albeit insigni￿cantly. The results for the growth in
total invention are much weaker, a pattern more suggestive of the H-1B program not having any
e⁄ect on native inventors.
Thus, the results in Table 4A mostly conform to Section 3￿ s expectations. The H-1B program
has a substantial impact on the location of Indian and Chinese invention, and it appears to be
associated with a small increase in English invention rates as well. However, it is natural to worry
whether the reduced-form interaction in (2) is capturing other heterogeneity across cities than H-
1B dependency or other time e⁄ects than the aggregate shifts in H-1B admissions. The ordering
of e⁄ects across ethnicities provides helpful assurance in the story presented. Other explanations
would need to similarly explain localized impacts among Indian and Chinese inventors.
One plausible, alternative explanation is that di⁄erential growth in patenting rates across
technology sectors produce Table 4A￿ s ethnic di⁄erences. Table 1 noted that Indian and Chinese
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sectors over the last two decades, such as software development, increased their propensity to
seek patent protection for a given rate of innovation. To the extent that these institutional shifts
and other sector-speci￿c changes overlay the H-1B aggregate trends modeled in equation (2),
the estimated ￿ parameters will be biased upward. Relative di⁄erences in ethnic concentration
across technologies in Table 1, however, suggest that this factor is unlikely to account for the
full e⁄ect measured in Table 4A.
Table 4B accounts explicitly for these technology trends by including measures of the expected
city-level patenting for each ethnic group. We construct these metrics by ￿rst calculating
the mean annual patenting done in the focal city by each ethnic group over 1990-1995 in 36
technology sectors. These sectors are the sub-categories of patent classi￿cations; examples
include "Resins", "Computer Peripherals", and "Optics." We then take subsequent growth in
national patenting for each sector, weight these trends by the city￿ s pre-period composition, and
sum across technologies. To maintain a consistent speci￿cation and to maximize explanatory
power, we include the expected patenting trends for all four ethnic groups in each estimation.
These trends control for national patenting growth by sector in a manner speci￿c to a city
and ethnicity. They account for potential shifts in patent propensity, as well as other sector-
speci￿c issues like industry cycles. It is important to understand, however, that controlling for
technology trends is a substantive restriction in the H-1B context. Many high-tech industry
executives argue that their whole sector is hurt by the reduced H-1B admissions, and di⁄erentially
so from less dependent industries. Under this scenario, technology trends remove ￿rst-order
e⁄ects of H-1B policies that our estimations should capture.
Coe¢ cients for these ethnic-speci￿c technology trends are documented in Panel A of Table
4B. Each ethnicity is particularly dependent on the expected trend for its own ethnicity. One
exception is that Chinese inventors experience rapid increases in cities with strong expected
Indian patenting growth. This e⁄ect mostly descends from early Indian concentration in infor-
mation technology and computer-related clusters. This pattern is consistent with a crowding-in
e⁄ect for existing US Chinese surrounding the H-1B program that was noted above when dis-
cussing the equal Indian and Chinese elasticities. We ￿nd very similar results for the coe¢ cients
on these ethnic-speci￿c technology trends when using the Census-based dependency.
When we introduce these trends, the relative ordering of e⁄ects remains the same as in
Table 4A. Indian and Chinese elasticities do decline, however, while measured elasticities for
English and total invention increase. The English inventor elasticity is a fourth of the Indian and
Chinese elasticities in the LCA-based regressions, and the total patenting response is consistently
di⁄erent from zero. These LCA-based results suggest a stronger crowding-in e⁄ect for English
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however, continue to ￿nd little evidence for crowding-in or crowding-out e⁄ects.
To summarize, shifts in the H-1B program are found to increase Indian and Chinese invention
in dependent cities across all estimations. We typically ￿nd small, positive elasticities for
English invention, with most estimates not statistically di⁄erent from zero. Elasticities for total
invention are slightly larger and more frequently statistically di⁄erent from zero. Combining the
median of these elasticity estimates with the relative sizes of inventor groups, we estimate that
20%-40% of the total patenting gains associated with increases in H-1B visas accrue through
English inventors. This would imply that indirect contributions are approximately half of the
direct contributions on immigrant SEs. This is weaker than the three-quarters e⁄ect evident
in the simple correlations of Section 2. These e⁄ects tend to be smaller in the most dependent
quintiles and larger when controlling for technology trends.
Partial R2 values measure the explanatory power of the regressors after we remove panel
￿xed e⁄ects and technology trends. We generally ￿nd that 4%-5% of the Indian and Chinese
variation at the city level can be explained by the dependency interaction. This explanatory
power is higher at 15% if technology trends are included. The explanatory power for English
invention is 0.5% and just over 1% for total innovation. Overall R2 values typically exceed 90%.
4.3 City-Level Robustness Analysis
The appendix documents several important robustness checks on these ￿ndings. We ￿rst sub-
stitute the six-year summation of the annual H-1B visa cap in place of Lowell￿ s H-1B population
estimates for H-1Bt in equation (2). We model six-year summations instead of three-year sum-
mations as renewals of H-1B visas do not apply towards subsequent caps. The cap summation
introduces more measurement error into the H-1B population estimate but it perhaps bene￿ts
from stronger exogeneity. The results are very similar with this alternative estimation, since the
cap has been binding in most years. Generally, the choice of H-1Bt is of second-order importance
to the dependency measure employed.
We also ￿nd similar results with several variants to the speci￿cation in equation (2). Robust
results are found when incorporating state-year ￿xed e⁄ects or dropping the West Coast of
the US. This stability argues against omitted variable biases at the regional level driving the
observed outcomes. The results are also not the exclusive product of the high-tech sector￿ s
growth in California, Oregon, and Washington. We further ￿nd similar results when testing
before and after 2001, when separately employing granted patents only, and when using a ￿rst-
di⁄erenced speci￿cation. The ￿ndings also hold when controlling for quintiles of city population
22or when controlling for growth in US citizen immigrant SEs through additional interaction terms
in equation (2).
We ￿nally undertake tests con￿rming the extent to which e⁄ects are evident throughout the
city dependency distribution. These tests are important as political economy factors in￿ uence
nationally-set visa levels (e.g., Reksulak et al. 2006, Facchini et al. 2008). Year e⁄ects account
for these aggregate levels but these controls are insu¢ cient if a handful of cities or ￿rms exert
extensive lobbying and receive disproportionate impacts.
Our quintile-based speci￿cations already provide comfort against this reverse causality story.
Sensitivity to H-1B admission ￿ uctuations grows monotonically with dependency. But while the
strongest associations are evident in the most dependent grouping, consistent and measurable
e⁄ects were also evident in the second most dependent quintile. San Francisco, Austin, and
similar cities may in￿ uence admission levels through lobbying e⁄orts but the second quintile
accounts for only 9% of LCA applications versus 86% for the upper quintile. This concentration
is due to both smaller dependency levels and smaller absolute city size on average. Finding
e⁄ects in this second quintile is reassuring.
The appendix further documents estimations that drop all patents associated with 307 of
the most highly-dependent ￿rms that we could identify. These ￿rms account for 30% of patents
during 1995-2006 and are discussed in more detail in Section 5. This grouping includes the
most frequent LCA applicants and the largest US patentors. Our results are robust to this
technique, con￿rming that the important e⁄ects estimated for the second quintile are not due
to a few in￿ uential ￿rms patenting in several cities. We also ￿nd similar coe¢ cients for the top
quintile when dropping the 20 most dependent cities of this group. These 20 cities account for
70% of all LCAs in the most dependent quintile, suggesting again that the results extend deeper
than the extreme cases like San Francisco and Boston.
4.4 Lag Structure of Treatment E⁄ects
Table 5 presents a lag structure analysis using a dynamic version of equation (2). The dependent
variable is the log growth in ethnic patenting from year t ￿ 1 to year t. We consider forward,
contemporaneous, and lagged changes in the H-1B population over two-year intervals. These
dynamics are interacted with the three quintile groupings. Our contemporaneous speci￿cations
in Tables 4A and 4B are motivated by empirical studies ￿nding that contemporaneous R&D
investments have the most important impact for rates of technology formation. In the context
of this paper, we consider how recent investments in hiring high-skilled immigrants a⁄ect in-
novation. The dynamic speci￿cations test whether this contemporaneous empirical strategy is
reasonable or not.
23The patterns in Table 5 are reassuring. Contemporaneous e⁄ects are the strongest in all
three quintiles relative to the reference group. As importantly, limited e⁄ects are evident on
forward changes or long-term lags. Two exceptions are important to note. First, lead values
exist for Indian and Chinese invention in the most dependent cities. While these estimates
are not statistically di⁄erent from zero, their size provides some prima facie evidence that the
admissions levels of the H-1B program may respond to strong visa demand. On the other hand,
it is very reassuring that lead e⁄ects are not evident for the second quintile, which demonstrates
a responsiveness to changes in H-1B admissions levels.
A second point of interest is the pattern of English invention over time. Contemporaneous
gains are evident, but both forward and long-term values are negative, albeit insigni￿cantly.
Summing across the changes indicates that English invention does increase, but the aggregate
e⁄ects are smaller than the contemporaneous gains indicate. This is in contrast to the other
ethnic groups and total invention where strong, positive gains exist when summing across the
whole lag structure. These pattern suggests that crowding-in e⁄ects estimated through the
contemporaneous speci￿cation may be transitory. These patterns are more consistent with
invention gains primarily accruing through the new immigrants themselves.13
4.5 Comparison to Canadian Cities
Canadian cities provide a useful baseline for comparing the estimated e⁄ects of the H-1B program
on US ethnic invention patterns. Indian and Chinese inventors account for about 15% of
Canada￿ s patents during the 1995-2006 period, only slightly more than in the US, and the
technology breakdowns are similar for the two countries. We therefore test whether Canadian
cities display similar or di⁄erent trends to those found in the US.
Identical trends in Canada and America would warn that our dependency metrics are biased
by other secular changes. As US and Canadian high-skilled immigration generally followed
similar trends during this period, an example would be Indian and Chinese immigration to
North America interacting with past immigrant networks. However, we cannot state in advance
that a null result for Canadian cities is the expected outcome either. Greater immigration
to the US through the H-1B program may encourage parallel immigration to Canada. Higher
H-1B admission levels could alternatively reduce Canadian SE immigration if the number of visa
seekers from India and China to North America is constant.
13While the H-1B population lag structure is consistent with a contemporaneous speci￿cation, lag structures
that employ six-year cap summations are not well de￿ned across the full 1995-2006 period. Forward or lagged
e⁄ects can be present, and the estimations are much more sensitive to speci￿cation design than those that model
H-1B population estimates for H-1Bt. This weakness is anticipated in Figure 4, as the strongest surge in the
six-year cap summation is during the early 2000s recession, when visa demand fell short of the available cap. On
the other hand, lag structures for cap summations are consistent during periods when the cap is constraining.
24The data extension is straightforward and described in detail in the appendix. Many Cana-
dian inventors seek patent protection from the USPTO. Using approximately 150k granted
patents and 65k non-overlapping applications ￿led from Canada, we estimate the ethnic com-
position of Canadian inventors in 49 metropolitan areas that are comparable in size and scope
to the US Metropolitan Statistical Areas through which we de￿ne US cities. Likewise, the
1990 Canadian Census of Populations (IPUMS) is used to construct non-citizen immigrant SE
dependency metrics roughly similar to our Census-based metrics for the US. We are able to
construct city-level dependencies for 22 cities and province-level dependencies for 27 cities. The
most dependent major Canadian cities are Toronto and Vancouver.
The Canadian sample is unfortunately too small for a quintile analysis. Instead, we group
cities into whether they are above or below the median dependency of their country in a simple
variant of equation (2). Panel A of Table 6 ￿rst re-estimates the US sample with this empirical
approach. The outcomes are very similar to the bottom of Table 4A. Panel B then estimates
the same relationship after we drop the most dependent quintile of the US distribution. We
undertake this second step as the most dependent Canadian cities, to the extent that we can align
the di⁄erent data sources, fall in the second highest quintile of the US dependency distribution.
This also removes the most worrisome US cities in terms of political economy factors. English
and total patenting outcomes are somewhat stronger in this restricted sample.
Panel C undertakes a similar analysis with the full Canadian sample, while Panel D drops
cities for which we cannot directly calculate dependencies. None of the results across the dif-
ferent speci￿cations show estimates that are signi￿cantly di⁄erent than zero. These Canadian
di⁄erentials hold across other speci￿cation variants, such as including ethnic technology trends
and using the six-year cap summation. These results are again reassuring for our empirical de-
sign. Although some of the point estimates might provide suggestive evidence that ￿ uctuations
in the H-1B visa quota have impacted Canadian innovation ￿ perhaps even to reduce Indian
invention when admission rates to the US are high ￿ we mainly consider these estimates as a
con￿rmation that our results are not being driven by other secular factors unrelated to H-1B
admissions.
4.6 State-Year Estimations from the CPS
As a ￿nal check on our city-level results, we employ state-year variation in SE populations
measured in the CPS. Since 1994, the CPS identi￿es whether respondents are non-citizen
immigrants, citizen immigrants, or US natives. While this direct observation of immigration
status is an important complement to our ethnic inventor records, the CPS brings substantial
liabilities. Most importantly, the CPS is designed as a representative sample for the US, not for
25small geographic areas like cities and states. As a consequence, we only observe immigrant SE
workers consistently over 1995-2006 in 26 states. Even for these complete series, small sample
sizes also result in substantial measurement error. Second, the CPS redesign in 2003 creates a
structural break in variable de￿nitions between 2002 and 2003. As a consequence, we employ
exclusively ￿rst-di⁄erenced speci￿cations that drop 2002-2003 changes. This dropped year is
an important in￿ ection point for the H-1B program but there is no way to separate economic
changes from coding changes through this survey.
Despite these caveats, the CPS yields comparable results to our ethnic patenting ￿ndings.
Panels A and B of Table 7 ￿rst look at simple correlations between immigrant SE growth and
domestic SE growth. These correlations are restricted to the sample of 26 states for which
immigrant SEs are continually observed, for a total of 260 observations. Panel A ￿nds that
growth in non-citizen SE immigrants is weakly correlated with native SE growth by state. Panel
B ￿nds stronger coe¢ cients when using total immigrant SE growth as the regressor. Panel B￿ s
coe¢ cients suggest that a 10% growth in immigrant SEs is correlated with a 0.5% and 1.6%
growth in native and total inventor populations, respectively. As in Section 2, the interpretation
of these correlations is limited but they do provide some support for the exercises in Table 2.
Panels C and D document reduced-form speci￿cations with the LCA and Census dependen-
cies similar to those found in equation (2). Due to the limited sample size, we only contrast
states above the median dependency level with those below the median. Columns 1-4 restrict
the panel to the 26 states for which some measure of immigrant SEs is observed in each year.
Columns 5 and 6 test native and total patenting responses across all states. These reduced-
form interactions are very similar to the ethnic patenting responses. Column 1 ￿nds growth
in non-citizen SEs with higher H-1B admission rates. Column 2 ￿nds a weaker elasticity for
total immigrant SE workers, which is to be expected. These results con￿rm the importance of
the H-1B program for explaining the spatial locations and growth of immigrant SEs through a
second data source.
Column 3 ￿nds mixed evidence regarding crowding-in or crowding-out e⁄ects for native
SE workers. The LCA-based interaction suggests a positive response, while the Census-based
dependency is negative. Column 5 suggests that these di⁄erences are likely due to the restricted
state sample. When considering all states ￿ and native SE workers are observed in all state-
years ￿ both dependencies yield positive growth e⁄ects for native SEs. The total SE workforce
is consistently found to increase in dependent states relative to non-dependent states when H-1B
admissions are higher. The CPS thus documents qualitatively similar trends to our primary
speci￿cations.
265 Firm-Level Analysis
We extend our city-level results with a ￿rm-level analysis that exploits additional detail that
is possible with the ethnic patenting data set. Many high-tech industry executives argue that
their ￿rms are especially prone to ￿ uctuations in H-1B admissions. We create a panel of the
most H-1B dependent ￿rms to test this claim. Figure 5 describes the share of total Indian and
Chinese invention in ￿ve of these major ￿rms over time. Substantial heterogeneity exists across
￿rms in levels of ethnic invention and trends. This level of detail allows us to characterize
impacts of H-1B visa changes in an alternative way to our city-level analysis. It is the ￿rst
large scale description of ethnic invention within ￿rms and the ￿rst analysis of the link between
immigration and innovation at the ￿rm level of which we are aware.
5.1 Ethnic Inventor Compositions Within Firms
We restrict our sample to very dependent ￿rms and their close peers. We de￿ne our initial
sample according to the following criteria: (1) ￿rms included in the 1999 Top 100 and 2006 Top
200 lists of H-1B sponsors; (2) ￿rms with assignee names accounting for 0.05% or more of patent
grants or applications during 2001-2004; and (3) ￿rms with assignee names accounting for 0.03%
or more of LCA applications during 2001-2006. Of the 592 unique ￿rms that satisfy one or
more of these criteria, 307 have at least one patent during 1995-2006. These ￿rms account for
more than 500k granted patents and unique applications to domestic inventors over 1995-2006;
they represent about 30% of all US patents with domestic inventors during this period.14
Of this sample, 177 ￿rms are publicly listed and have at least one US domestic patent in every
year from 1995 to 2006. Tables 8 and 9 detail general characteristics of these ￿rms. They have
over 130 patents on average per year, with a standard deviation of almost twice that amount.
The ethnicity and geography of inventors in these ￿rms broadly match US aggregates. One
notable exception is that sampled ￿rms tend to patent more in Computers and Communications
technologies, which is to be expected from our focus on ￿rms likely dependent on H-1B visas.
A comparison of means and medians across these di⁄erent technology categories and regions
also demonstrates that ￿rms tend to specialize in particular types of innovation and to spatially
cluster their innovations. Sampled ￿rms are generally quite large, although substantial variance
exists in sales, employees, and R&D expenditures. More generally, the median-to-mean gap in
14Creating this panel was the most intensive part of this project. The appendix lists included ￿rms, details
our selection methodology, and provides descriptive statistics. We also describe the extensive work undertaken
to account for multiple assignee names per ￿rm and major corporate restructurings. The developed sample is
not sensitive to looking at top patenting ￿rms in di⁄erent periods (e.g. top patentors during 1995-2006 versus
2001-2004).
27many metrics (e.g., sales, LCAs, annual patents) shows that the distribution of ￿rm size in the
sample is left skewed.
Table 9 analyzes these ￿rm characteristics in a multivariate setting. We estimate these
regressions at the ￿rm level, aggregating over all of the years in our sample. In each year we
￿rst construct the share of the ￿rm￿ s total patents in each technology category and similarly
construct the share of the ￿rm￿ s patents in each region. We then regress the total number
of patents for each ethnicity on these technology and geographical specialization variables as
well as on measures of ￿rm size. Column headers in Table 9 indicate ethnic inventor shares
considered, and each row￿ s coe¢ cients sum to zero. Several results stand out. Larger ￿rms and
those that are more specialized in high-tech innovations tend to have higher shares of Indian
and Chinese inventors. Geography also matters. Firms undertaking most of their innovative
activity in the New England, Middle Atlantic, or West Coast regions have higher average shares
of ethnic inventors. Overall, R2 values range from 0.35 to 0.53, indicating a substantial degree
of explanatory power. Technology and geographic concentration accounts for more of this
explanatory power than ￿rm size.
5.2 Empirical Results
To evaluate the temporal impact of H-1B policies, we restrict our sample to 76 ￿rms. All of
these ￿rms are publicly listed, based in the US, have at least ￿ve patents per year, and have
at least one inventor of each relevant ethnicity in every year from 1995 to 2006. The publicly-
listed restriction allows us to utilize Compustat employment and sales data from 1990-1995 for
normalizing our dependency metric. The ethnic patenting restriction focuses attention on the
intensive margin for this analysis.
The ￿rm speci￿cation takes the form,
ln(PAT
Dep
f;t ) = ￿f + ￿t + ￿ ln(ExpPATf;t) (3)
+￿1 ￿ [If(More Dependent, Computer) ￿ ln(H-1Bt)]
+￿2 ￿ [If(Less Dependent, Computer) ￿ ln(H-1Bt)]
+￿3 ￿ [If(More Dependent, non-Computer) ￿ ln(H-1Bt)] + ￿f;t;
where ￿f and ￿t are vectors of ￿rm and year ￿xed e⁄ects, respectively. We group ￿rms into four
categories based upon two dimensions: (1) degree of dependency on the H-1B program, and (2)
whether the ￿rm￿ s innovations are oriented towards the computer sector or not. We measure
the ￿rst dimension of H-1B dependency through each ￿rm￿ s 2001-2002 LCA ￿lings normalized
by Compustat sales. We identify the second dimension through a ￿rm￿ s most frequent patent
category. As in Table 1, the six main patent categories are Chemicals, Computers, Drugs,
28Electrical, Mechanical, and Miscellaneous. Firms with most of their patents in the second
category are deemed computer-oriented for this analysis.
We then interact H-1Bt with indicator variables for more dependent computer ￿rms, less
dependent computer ￿rms, and more dependent non-computer ￿rms. E⁄ects for these ￿rms
types are measured relative to less dependent ￿rms outside of the computer sector. Main e⁄ects
for interactions are again absorbed into panel e⁄ects. We include a ￿rm-speci￿c measure of
expected patenting ExpPATf;t to control for di⁄erent technology trends over time. Unlike
before, however, we do not construct ethnic-speci￿c technology trends given the limited pre-
period data for many ￿rms.
Table 10 presents the ￿rm-level ￿ndings. Ethnic invention, and Indian invention in particular,
is closely tied to H-1B admissions levels in more dependent ￿rms in the computer sector. A
10% growth in H-1B admissions correlates with an 8% growth in Indian invention relative to
the reference category of less dependent ￿rms outside of the computer sector. Point estimates
for highly dependent ￿rms outside of the computer sector are similar to less dependent ￿rms in
the computer sector, suggesting a 2% di⁄erential for both. It should be noted that the ￿rm
panel was constructed around ￿rms expected to be dependent upon the H-1B program, so the
baseline category is not weakly dependent as in the city-level analysis. Instead, the results point
to particularly powerful and disproportionate impacts even among heavily in￿ uenced ￿rms.
The fourth column documents the level of English invention. Unlike ethnic invention in
Columns 1-3, higher H-1B admissions are not associated with exceptional growth in English
patenting in more dependent ￿rms in the computer sector. In fact, the growth is slightly weaker
than that experienced by more dependent ￿rms outside of the computer sector. The results
suggest that additional patenting gains in more dependent high-tech ￿rms primarily accrue
through immigrants themselves. Crowding-in or crowding-out e⁄ects for natives do not appear
to be strong in these special cases.
This ￿rm-level analysis is a nice robustness check on the city-level approach. It substantiates
claims of high-tech executives that their ￿rms are especially vulnerable to high-skilled immigra-
tion policies for temporary workers. On the other hand, the results do not point to large
crowding-in or crowding-out e⁄ects. As some of these ￿rms are among the primary lobbyists
for H-1B legislation, these results should be interpreted as partial correlations only.
6 Conclusion
Over the last ￿fteen years, the H-1B visa program for temporary workers has played an important
role in US innovation patterns. As immigrants are especially important for US innovation
29and technology commercialization, this makes the H-1B program a matter of signi￿cant policy
importance. We ￿nd that ￿ uctuations in H-1B admissions levels signi￿cantly in￿ uence the rate
of Indian and Chinese patenting in cities and ￿rms dependent upon the program relative to their
peers. Most of our speci￿cations also ￿nd weak crowding-in e⁄ects or no e⁄ects at all for native
patenting. We conclude that total invention increases with higher admission levels primarily
through the direct contributions of immigrant inventors.
We close with a discussion of four related research questions outside of the scope of this
study that we hope that can be addressed in future work. First, we have focused exclusively on
the H-1B program given its particular importance in SE and large admissions ￿ uctuations. We
hope that future research will consider other temporary visa categories. The H-1B program has
unique characteristics that are not shared by many other immigrant categories. Quantifying
employment e⁄ects due to other visa programs will clarify whether our weak crowding-in results
apply generally or are due to the particular features of the H-1B program. For example, the
prevailing wage requirement may limit crowding-out e⁄ects to the extent that the requirement
is followed. Likewise, the manner in which H-1B workers are tied to their sponsoring ￿rms
may produce special outcomes. Such comparative assessments will also aid policy makers when
crafting future immigration policies.
Second, our analysis considers high-frequency variation over twelve years. We are not able
to quantify the long-run impacts of these policy choices as a consequence. Given the time and
expense involved in training new SEs, long-run crowding-in and crowding-out e⁄ects for natives
can di⁄er from short-run e⁄ects. Fluctuations in the H-1B cap are quite recent, so researchers
will need to unite our work with studies exploiting low-frequency variation to understand these
dynamics (e.g., Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle 2008). This characterization would in turn be an
important input into future theoretical work on how the supply side of innovation in￿ uences
overall US technology growth.
Third, our analysis quanti￿es city-level patenting growth due to higher H-1B admission rates
in broad terms. There are many research groups operating within cities: ￿rms, universities,
government labs, private inventors, and others. We have not analyzed how changes in the H-1B
program alter the local relationships among these di⁄erent institutions. For example, the current
comparative advantage of universities for obtaining H-1B visas may result in greater dependencies
of local industry on universities for certain forms of SE advancement. Understanding these local
inter-linkages will be informative for both H-1B program assessments and of general interest for
technology transfer studies.
Finally, although ethnic patenting data allows us to characterize the role of H-1B workers
for US innovation in a unique way, we recognize that the H-1B program impacts many other
aspects of the US economy. Indeed, about half of the major employers of H-1B visas that
30we identi￿ed for our ￿rm sample did not ￿le for a patent during our period of study. Future
research should quantify the economic impacts for other sectors like accounting and consulting
￿rms, banks and ￿nancial institutions, and public services in ways that are appropriate for these
sectors. It will likewise be particularly interesting to quantify job creation or displacement
e⁄ects for occupations other than inventors among high-tech ￿rms.
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Fig. 1: Ethnic Share of US Domestic Patents
Notes: Trends are ethnic shares of patents filed by inventors residing in the US.  
Patents are grouped by application years.  English (83%→71%), Japanese 









































Fig. 2: Indian Contribution by Technology
Notes: Trends are Indian invention shares by broad technology 
categories for patents filed by inventors residing in the US.  












































Fig. 3: Chinese Contribution by Technology
Notes: Trends are Chinese invention shares by broad technology 
categories for patents filed by inventors residing in the US.  Patents 
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Fig. 4:  H-1B Visas and Population Estimates
Notes:  Data are given by fiscal years used for H-1B 
visa issuances.   Visa issuances can exceed cap in 
later years due to exemptions for universities  and 
similar institutions described in the text.
Lowell H-1B Visa 
PopulationEstimate






































Fig. 5: Indian and Chinese Share by Firm
Notes: Trends are Indian and Chinese inventor shares 
for illustrative firms from patents filed within the US.  





Proctor & GambleEnglish Chinese European Hispanic Indian Japanese Korean Russian Vietnam.
1975-1979 82.5% 2.2% 8.3% 2.9% 1.9% 0.6% 0.3% 1.2% 0.1%
1980-1984 81.1% 2.9% 7.9% 3.0% 2.4% 0.7% 0.5% 1.3% 0.1%
1985-1989 79.8% 3.6% 7.5% 3.2% 2.9% 0.8% 0.6% 1.4% 0.2%
1990-1994 77.6% 4.6% 7.2% 3.5% 3.6% 0.9% 0.7% 1.5% 0.4%
1995-1999 73.9% 6.5% 6.8% 3.9% 4.8% 0.9% 0.8% 1.8% 0.5%
2000-2004 70.4% 8.5% 6.4% 4.2% 5.4% 1.0% 1.1% 2.2% 0.6%
Chemicals 73.4% 7.2% 7.5% 3.6% 4.5% 1.0% 0.8% 1.7% 0.3%
Computers 70.1% 8.2% 6.3% 3.8% 6.9% 1.1% 0.9% 2.1% 0.7%
Pharmaceuticals 72.9% 7.1% 7.4% 4.3% 4.2% 1.1% 0.9% 1.8% 0.4%
Electrical 71.6% 8.0% 6.8% 3.7% 4.9% 1.1% 1.1% 2.1% 0.7%
Mechanical 80.4% 3.2% 7.1% 3.5% 2.6% 0.7% 0.6% 1.6% 0.2%
Miscellaneous 81.3% 2.9% 7.0% 3.8% 2.1% 0.6% 0.6% 1.4% 0.3%
Top Cities as a  KC (89) SF (13) NOR (12) MIA (16) SF (7) SD (2) BAL (2) BOS (3) AUS (2)
Percentage of  WS (88) LA (8) STL (11) SA (9) AUS (7) SF (2) LA (2) NYC (3) SF (1)
City’s Patents NAS (88) AUS (6) NYC (11) WPB (7) PRT (6) LA (2) SF (1) SF (3) LA (1)
Bachelors Share 87.6% 2.7% 2.3% 2.4% 2.3% 0.6% 0.5% 0.4% 1.2%
Masters Share 78.9% 6.7% 3.4% 2.2% 5.4% 0.9% 0.7% 0.8% 1.0%
Doctorate Share 71.2% 13.2% 4.0% 1.7% 6.5% 0.9% 1.5% 0.5% 0.4%
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics for Inventors Residing in US
Ethnicity of Inventor
A. Ethnic Inventor Shares Estimated from US Inventor Records, 1975-2004
B. Ethnic Scientist and Engineer Shares Estimated from 1990 US Census Records
Notes:  Panel A presents descriptive statistics for inventors residing in the US at the time of patent application.  Inventor ethnicities are estimated through inventors' 
names using techniques described in the text.  Patents are grouped by application years and major technology fields.  Cities, defined through Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas, include AUS (Austin), BAL (Baltimore), BOS (Boston), KC (Kansas City), LA (Los Angeles), MIA (Miami), NAS (Nashville), NOR (New Orleans), NYC (New 
York City), PRT (Portland), SA (San Antonio), SD (San Diego), SF (San Francisco), STL (St. Louis), WPB (West Palm Beach), and WS (Winston-Salem).  Cities are 
identified from inventors' city names using city lists collected from the Office of Social and Economic Data Analysis at the University of Missouri, with a matching rate of 
99%.  Manual recoding further ensures all patents with more than 100 citations and all city names with more than 100 patents are identified.  Panel B presents comparable 
statistics calculated from the 1990 Census using country of birth for scientists and engineers.  Country groupings follow Kerr (2007); English provides a residual in the 
Census statistics.City & Year Column (1) plus Column (2) plus Column (2) plus Column (2) plus
Fixed Expected State-Year Population Dropping
Effects Patenting Fixed Weights Largest 20%
Trends Effects of Cities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Indian and Chinese 0.137 0.099 0.079 0.127 0.097
Ethnic Patenting (0.024) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022)
Log Indian and Chinese 0.211 0.172 0.158 0.202 0.176
Ethnic Patenting (0.022) (0.018) (0.019) (0.023) (0.020)
Table 2:  City-Year Correlations of English and Indian/Chinese Patenting
A. Log English Patenting
B. Log Total Patenting
Notes:  City-year regressions consider 1995-2006 with 3372 observations.  Column 5 contains 2700 observations.  Regressions contain city and 
year fixed effects, are unweighted excepting Column 4, and cluster standard errors by city.  The appendix extends this analysis. LCA-Based Dependency Census-Based Dependency
City's 2001-2002 LCA Filings for City's 1990 Non-Citizen Immigrant SE
H-1B Visas Per Capita (x1000) Workforce per Capita (x1000)
(1) (2)
#1            San Francisco, CA      8.323   Lafayette-W. Lafayette, IN      7.810 
#2                    Miami, FL      5.502   Bryan-College Station, TX      5.571 
#3               Washington, DC      5.430   San Francisco, CA      5.096 
#4           Raleigh-Durham, NC      5.220   Columbia, MO      4.462 
#5                   Boston, MA      5.149   Gainesville, FL      4.146 
#6                   Austin, TX      4.897   Champaign-Urbana-Rantoul, IL      4.023 
#7                 New York, NY      4.777   Washington, DC      3.168 
#8 Burlington, VT      4.491   Boston, MA      3.129 
#9                  Atlanta, GA      4.116   Raleigh-Durham, NC      2.723 
#10        Dallas-Fort Worth, TX      3.943   Los Angeles, CA      2.288 
#11 Champaign-Urbana-Rantoul, IL      3.819   Rochester, MN      2.247 
#12 Iowa City, IA      3.804   New York, NY      2.185 
#13                  Houston, TX      3.712   Houston, TX      2.156 
#14 Bryan-College Station, TX      3.577   Spokane, WA      2.078 
#15                  Seattle, WA      3.393   State College, PA      2.058 
#16 Charlottesville, VA      3.310   Pittsfield, MA      2.056 
#17                San Diego, CA      3.021   San Diego, CA      2.040 
#18              Los Angeles, CA      2.811   Cumberland, MD      1.884 
#19 Bloomington-Normal, IL      2.792   Austin, TX      1.770 
#20          West Palm Beach, FL      2.744   Fort Collins-Loveland, CO      1.755 
Table 3:  Most-Dependent Cities on H-1B Program
Notes:  Table presents largest dependency values on the H-1B program.  The appendix documents dependencies for all 
major patenting cities.Log Log Log Log Log
Indian Chinese Other Ethnicity English Total
Patenting Patenting Patenting Patenting Patenting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Third Dependency Quintile [LCA] 0.313 0.311 0.305 -0.010 0.037
(0.087) (0.095) (0.106) (0.101) (0.107)
Second Dependency Quintile [LCA] 0.623 0.741 0.461 0.050 0.078
(0.090) (0.108) (0.096) (0.087) (0.083)
Most Dependent Quintile [LCA] 0.982 1.179 0.593 0.109 0.172
(0.078) (0.091) (0.092) (0.086) (0.086)
Third Dependency Quintile [Census] 0.207 0.569 0.134 0.048 0.064
(0.104) (0.123) (0.109) (0.097) (0.099)
Second Dependency Quintile [Census] 0.398 0.489 0.285 0.064 0.080
(0.096) (0.115) (0.103) (0.100) (0.098)
Most Dependent Quintile [Census] 0.550 0.718 0.215 -0.019 0.029
(0.097) (0.109) (0.101) (0.081) (0.083)
Table 4A: City-Year Regressions of H-1B Program Dependency and US Invention
A. LCA-Based Dependency 
B. Census-Based Dependency 
Log National H-1B Population x
Notes:  City-year regressions consider 1995-2006.  Regressions include city and year fixed effects, have 3372 observations, are unweighted, and 
cluster standard errors by city.  Cities are grouped into quintiles based upon indicated H-1B dependency estimate.  The H-1B population regressor 
is interacted with binary indicator variables for the top three dependency quintiles to measure effects relative to the bottom two quintiles, as in 
equation (2) in the text.
Log National H-1B Population xLog Log Log Log Log
Indian Chinese Other Ethnicity English Total
Patenting Patenting Patenting Patenting Patenting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Third Dependency Quintile [LCA] 0.172 0.154 0.210 0.043 0.103
(0.088) (0.086) (0.102) (0.074) (0.077)
Second Dependency Quintile [LCA] 0.362 0.455 0.285 0.105 0.162
(0.089) (0.113) (0.097) (0.077) (0.075)
Most Dependent Quintile [LCA] 0.552 0.714 0.338 0.164 0.266
(0.098) (0.106) (0.098) (0.081) (0.079)
Log Predicted Indian Patents 0.345 0.393 0.035 -0.140 -0.087
in City due to Tech Trends (0.075) (0.091) (0.093) (0.071) (0.065)
Log Predicted Chinese Patents 0.135 0.104 0.037 0.049 -0.010
in City due to Tech Trends (0.063) (0.075) (0.088) (0.069) (0.065)
Log Predicted Other Ethnicity Patents 0.022 0.079 0.343 -0.118 -0.168
in City due to Tech Trends (0.043) (0.041) (0.068) (0.063) (0.063)
Log Predicted English Patents -0.019 -0.040 0.036 0.658 0.693
in City due to Tech Trends (0.021) (0.020) (0.032) (0.046) (0.048)
Third Dependency Quintile [Census] 0.067 0.412 0.049 0.014 0.027
(0.087) (0.106) (0.098) (0.081) (0.082)
Second Dependency Quintile [Census] 0.105 0.162 0.112 0.056 0.079
(0.085) (0.101) (0.095) (0.076) (0.072)
Most Dependent Quintile [Census] 0.139 0.256 -0.014 0.006 0.059
(0.080) (0.089) (0.092) (0.072) (0.073)
Notes:  See Table 4A.  Panel B includes unreported ethnic-specific technology trends similar to Panel A.
Table 4B: City-Year Regressions Including Ethnic-Specific Technology Trends
A. LCA-Based Dependency
Log National H-1B Population x
B. Census-Based Dependency (Ethnic-Specific Technology Trends Not Reported)
Log National H-1B Population xΔ Log Δ Log Δ Log Δ Log Δ Log
Indian Chinese Other Ethnicity English Total
Patenting Patenting Patenting Patenting Patenting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Forward
[Log H-1B Pop (t+2) - Log H-1B Pop (t)] x 0.060 0.077 0.114 -0.044 -0.019
Third Dependency Quintile [LCA] (0.088) (0.079) (0.109) (0.095) (0.094)
[Log H-1B Pop (t+2) - Log H-1B Pop (t)] x -0.017 0.000 -0.034 -0.037 -0.041
Second Dependency Quintile [LCA] (0.080) (0.088) (0.099) (0.085) (0.084)
[Log H-1B Pop (t+2) - Log H-1B Pop (t)] x 0.128 0.161 -0.015 -0.073 -0.033
Most Dependent Quintile [LCA] (0.084) (0.094) (0.089) (0.083) (0.083)
Contemporaneous
[Log H-1B Pop (t) - Log H-1B Pop (t-2)] x 0.013 0.110 0.091 0.073 0.064
Third Dependency Quintile [LCA] (0.122) (0.111) (0.143) (0.134) (0.129)
[Log H-1B Pop (t) - Log H-1B Pop (t-2)] x 0.264 0.266 0.373 0.080 0.093
Second Dependency Quintile [LCA] (0.110) (0.120) (0.141) (0.117) (0.107)
[Log H-1B Pop (t) - Log H-1B Pop (t-2)] x 0.218 0.448 0.344 0.199 0.158
Most Dependent Quintile [LCA] (0.096) (0.112) (0.121) (0.115) (0.109)
Lagged
[Log H-1B Pop (t-2) - Log H-1B Pop (t-4)] x 0.155 -0.035 -0.027 -0.040 -0.027
Third Dependency Quintile [LCA] (0.097) (0.077) (0.109) (0.094) (0.086)
[Log H-1B Pop (t-2) - Log H-1B Pop (t-4)] x 0.039 0.096 -0.132 -0.040 -0.035
Second Dependency Quintile [LCA] (0.080) (0.095) (0.098) (0.079) (0.069)
[Log H-1B Pop (t-2) - Log H-1B Pop (t-4)] x 0.177 -0.027 -0.058 -0.118 -0.071
Most Dependent Quintile [LCA] (0.063) (0.076) (0.074) (0.071) (0.064)
Table 5:  City-Year Lag Structure Tests
Notes:  See Table 4A.Log Log Log Log Log
Indian Chinese Other Ethnicity English Total
Patenting Patenting Patenting Patenting Patenting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log US National H-1B Population x 0.411 0.538 0.207 -0.014 0.026
Most Dependent Half [US Census] (0.072) (0.084) (0.077) (0.068) (0.069)
Observations 3372 3372 3372 3372 3372 
Log US National H-1B Population x 0.298 0.522 0.203 0.052 0.068
Most Dependent Half [US Census] (0.079) (0.090) (0.088) (0.079) (0.080)
Observations 2700 2700 2700 2700 2700 
Log US National H-1B Population x -0.228 0.037 -0.085 -0.135 -0.043
Most Dependent Half [CAN Census] (0.174) (0.226) (0.178) (0.181) (0.174)
Observations 588 588 588 588 588 
Log US National H-1B Population x -0.174 -0.038 0.125 0.078 0.025
Most Dependent Half [CAN Census] (0.271) (0.360) (0.233) (0.195) (0.220)
Observations 264 264 264 264 264 
Table 6: Comparison of US and Canadian Cities
D. Canadian Sample of Cities, Without Province-Level Dependencies
Notes:  City-year regressions consider 1995-2006.  Canadian cities are those for which pseudo-dependencies can be calculated from the 1990 
Canadian Census.  The top US dependency quintile is removed in Panel B as the maximum dependency in the Canadian sample falls in the second 
US dependency quintile.  Panel D drops Canadian cities for which we can only determine province-level dependency rates.  Regressions include 
city and year fixed effects, are unweighted, and cluster standard errors by city.   Cities are grouped into upper and lower halves for each country 
based upon dependency estimates.  The H-1B population regressor is interacted with a binary indicator variable for being in the upper half of the 
distribution.  Coefficient estimates are relative to the lower half of the distribution.
B. US Sample of Cities, Removing Top Quintile of US Cities
A. US Sample of Cities
C. Canadian Sample of CitiesΔ Log
non-Citizen Δ Log Δ Log Δ Log Δ Log Δ Log
Immigrant Immigrant Native Total Native Total
SE Workers SE Workers SE Workers SE Workers SE Workers SE Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ Log non-Citizen Immigrant 0.016 0.085
SE Workers (0.018) (0.015)
Δ Log Immigrant 0.046 0.157
SE Workers (0.022) (0.019)
Δ Log National H-1B Population x 0.485 0.294 0.103 0.159 0.142 0.196
Most Dependent Half [LCA] (0.301) (0.369) (0.150) (0.114) (0.077) (0.074)
Δ Log National H-1B Population x 0.742 0.448 -0.063 0.037 0.055 0.101
Most Dependent Half [Census] (0.327) (0.388) (0.150) (0.112) (0.080) (0.078)
Observations 260 260 260 260 510 510
Table 7: CPS Regressions of H-1B Program Dependency
States with Measured Immigrant SE Workers All States
A. Correlations of non-Citizen Immigrant Growth and Native Inventor Growth
Notes:  State-year regressions consider 1995-2006 through first-differenced specifications.  Changes from 2002-2003 are excluded due to the redesign of 
the CPS in 2003.  Regressions include year fixed effects, are unweighted, and cluster standard errors by state.  Columns 1-4 restrict the CPS sample to the 
26 states that report immigrant SE populations in each year from 1995-2006.  Columns 5 and 6 use all states and the District of Columbia.
B Correlations of Total Immigrant Growth and Native Inventor Growth
C.  Reduced-Form Estimations with LCA-Based Dependency
D.  Reduced-Form Estimations with Census-Based DependencyMedian Mean Stand. Dev. Minimum Maximum US Totals
Annual Patent Count 57 132 238 0.1 2098
Indian Inventors 4% 6% 5% 0% 26% 5%
Chinese Inventors 7% 8% 6% 0% 41% 8%
Other Ethnic Inventors 15% 16% 7% 0% 50% 15%
English Inventors 73% 71% 13% 39% 96% 72%
Chemicals 5% 13% 18% 0% 76% 13%
Computers & Communications 18% 33% 34% 0% 100% 23%
Drugs & Medical  0% 9% 21% 0% 89% 11%
Electrical & Electronic  10% 17% 20% 0% 98% 19%
Mechanical 7% 15% 18% 0% 93% 17%
Miscellaneous 5% 13% 19% 0% 99% 17%
New England 2% 7% 15% 0% 93% 8%
Middle Atlantic 0% 15% 26% 0% 95% 15%
East North Central 2% 17% 29% 0% 100% 16%
West North Central 0% 6% 18% 0% 100% 6%
South Atlantic 2% 8% 18% 0% 100% 10%
East South Central 0% 3% 14% 0% 100% 2%
West South Central 1% 9% 21% 0% 97% 8%
Mountain 1% 7% 18% 0% 98% 7%
Pacific 7% 28% 35% 0% 100% 28%
Annual LCA Count 40 117 239 0 2254
Annual Sales 5,001 16,719 28,737 4 166,383
Annual Employees 22 54 85 0 611
Annual R&D 166 721 1,274 0 7,716




Notes:  Compustat Sales and R&D expenditures are in millions of dollars.  Compustat Employees figures are in thousands of 
employees.Indian Chinese Other Ethnicities English
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of Mean Annual Patents 0.009 0.006 -0.012 -0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
Log of Mean Annual Sales -0.001 -0.002 0.012 -0.009
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Chemicals 0.031 0.114 -0.030 -0.115
(0.024) (0.034) (0.039) (0.061)
Computers & Communications 0.047 0.076 0.011 -0.134
(0.016) (0.022) (0.026) (0.041)
Drugs & Medical -0.006 0.082 -0.001 -0.075
(0.020) (0.028) (0.032) (0.050)
Electrical & Electronic 0.045 0.130 0.007 -0.182
(0.021) (0.029) (0.034) (0.054)
Mechanical -0.023 0.041 -0.026 0.007
(0.025) (0.035) (0.040) (0.063)
New England 0.028 0.044 0.111 -0.183
(0.029) (0.040) (0.047) (0.074)
Middle Atlantic 0.051 0.060 0.094 -0.205
(0.024) (0.035) (0.040) (0.063)
East North Central 0.015 0.022 0.059 -0.096
(0.025) (0.035) (0.041) (0.065)
West North Central -0.001 0.030 -0.013 -0.016
(0.027) (0.038) (0.044) (0.069)
South Atlantic 0.016 0.063 0.099 -0.179
(0.029) (0.041) (0.047) (0.075)
West South Central 0.041 0.050 0.074 -0.165
(0.026) (0.037) (0.043) (0.068)
Mountain 0.020 0.007 0.058 -0.084
(0.028) (0.039) (0.046) (0.072)
Pacific 0.057 0.091 0.136 -0.284
(0.023) (0.033) (0.038) (0.060)
Constant -0.035 -0.053 0.019 1.070
(0.029) (0.041) (0.047) (0.074)
Overall R
2  0.45 0.39 0.35 0.53
R
2 with only sales and patents 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.02
R
2 with only technology categories 0.25 0.25 0.08 0.26
R
2 with only geographic areas 0.25 0.24 0.21 0.41
Table 9:  Firm Characteristics and Ethnic Inventor Shares
Ethnic Shares of Firm's Patenting
Technology Shares of Firm Patents (Other/Miscellaneous Category omitted):
Regional Shares of Firm Patents (East South Central omitted):
Notes:  Firm-level regressions consider averages over 1995-2004 period.  Regressions are unweighted.Log Log Log Log Log
Indian Chinese Other Ethnicity English Total
Patenting Patenting Patenting Patenting Patenting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log National H-1B Population x
More Dependent Half of  0.782 0.416 0.671 0.136 0.399
Computer-Oriented Firms (0.338) (0.465) (0.355) (0.320) (0.323)
Less Dependent Half of 0.152 -0.157 0.073 0.036 0.048
Computer-Oriented Firms (0.221) (0.396) (0.243) (0.236) (0.233)
More Dependent Half of  0.184 0.134 0.175 0.153 0.208
non-Computer-Oriented Firms (0.248) (0.326) (0.241) (0.189) (0.194)
Log Predicted Firm Patents 0.800 0.744 0.745 0.716 0.733
due to Technology Trends (0.152) (0.164) (0.155) (0.131) (0.126)
Table 10:  Firm-Year Regressions of H-1B Dependency by Sector
Notes:  Firm-year regressions consider 1995-2006.  Regressions include firm and year fixed effects, have 972 observations, are unweighted, and cluster 
standard errors by firm.  Firms are divided into computer-oriented firms and those outside the computer sector through each firm's most frequent patent 
category.  Regressions interact national H-1B population changes with an indicator variable for more dependent computer firms, less dependent computer 
firms, and more dependent non-computer firms.  Effects are measured relative less dependent firms outside of the computer sector.